A whole book can be written on the subjects of pleadings and proof in prosecuting and defending a UDRP proceeding. The requirements for both should not be taken lightly, yet there are numerous examples of parties doing just that. Channel Intelligence, Inc.v. Ethan Lacey, D2009-0551 (WIPO June 28, 2009) is exemplary for the Complainant believing that pleading a trademark right alone is the coin that captures a domain name. UDRP may be “litigation lite” but for the remedy requested it demands in return satisfying substantive tests.

Except for showing that it had a registered trademark for SELL CAST the Complainant alleged no other facts in the pleadings. The Respondent purchased the domain name from a third party and operates an active website at <sellcast.com> “at which an Internet user [can] purchase various products, mostly clothing, from different retailers.” The Complainant’s allegations in support of paragraph 4(a)(ii) and 4(a)(iii) are identical, namely that they merely recite the registered trademark, that the Respondent lacks rights or legitimate interests and registered and is using the domain name in bad faith. Thinking no doubt that it was making an important contribution to UDRP law the Complainant also advanced the notion that the Respondent is liable for cybersquatting under the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act.

So lacking in content was the complaint that the Panel stated that it “need not look beyond [it] in order to decide the case.” Absence of proof alone “is grounds for denying the Complaint.” For a successful complaint there must be allegations and proof:

Without proof the Complaint fails under paragraphs 4(a)(ii) and 4(a)(iii) of the Policy, as there is nothing to support a finding of bad faith and nothing to suggest that Respondent’s recent use of the disputed domain name is anything other than the legitimate retail site it appears to be. As far as this Policy proceeding is concerned, that is the end of the matter. This Panel has no jurisdiction to make any findings under the United States law that Complainant cites above. Such matters belong in the national courts.

Lacking “content” and denying the complaint “for so fundamental a reason as failure to allege and offer proof of facts” calls into question the Complainant’s good faith commencing the proceeding. The Panel found that the complaint “was brought primarily to harass the domain-name holder ... and constitutes an abuse of the administrative proceeding.” It is not clear whether the complaint was prepared by counsel. Revealed only is that the Complainant was “represented internally.”