In the recent cybersquatting domain dispute of Frederick’s of Hollywood Group Inc. v. Blue Water LLC FA1290927 (Nat. Arb. Forum, December 3, 2009) a single member Panel was faced with a dispute over ten domains. Complainant, uses the marks FREDERICK’S OF HOLLYWOOD and FREDERICK’S related to its women’s clothing and lingerie business since 1946. Complainant maintains a web site at www.fredericks.com. Complainant has a specific third party affiliate program, allowing fees to be paid to authorized third parties for directing traffic to Complainant’s official site. The affiliate policy specifically restricts the use of misspelled domains. Respondent registered one of the domain in 2003 and the other nine in 2006. According to the decision, all of the disputed domain names resolved to Complainant’s web site.
Paragraph 4(a) of the ICANN UDRP Policy requires that Complainant must prove each of the following three elements to obtain an order that a domain name should be cancelled or transferred: (1) the domain name registered by Respondent is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark or service mark in which Complainant has rights; and (2) Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the domain name; and (3) the domain name has been registered and is being used in bad faith.
The Panel began its analysis, noting that Frederick’s of Hollywood has sufficiently shown its rights to the marks. The Panel found that the domains contained minor changes which were not sufficient to distinguish them from Complainant’s mark.
Additionally, one or more of the following changes were made in each disputed domain name to the mark (1) the addition of one extra letter; (2) the transposition of two letters in the mark; or (3) the replacement of one letter in the mark with another. The Panel finds that these changes are insufficient to overcome the confusing similarity that arises from using Complainant’s mark in the disputed domain name.
The Panel found the domain were confusingly similar to Frederick’s marks.
Moving to the second element, the Panel noted that Frederick’s presented a prima facie case, and despite the lack of response from Respondent, it would still review the record. Complainant contended that Respondent was not licensed to use the marks. Additionally, the Panel found that Respondent was not commonly known by the disputed domains. The Panel found that Respondent’s attempt at profiting from Complainant’s affiliate program using these typosquatted domains was not a bona fide use. Additionally, the act of typosquatting was found to be evidence of lacking rights or legitimate interests. The Panel found that this second element was satisfied by Complainant.
Moving to the final element, bad faith, the Panel noted that the disputed domains began to be registered nearly forty-five years after Frederick’s established trademark rights. The Panel explained that since the disputed domains resolved to Complainant’s own web site, that consumers would be confused as to affiliation or control. Additionally, since the domains contained typographical errors, this was evidence of bad faith. Lastly, by violating Complainant’s affiliate program, this was also evidence of bad faith.
Ultimately, the Panel found that Complainant satisfied all of the elements, and ordered all ten domains be TRANSFERRED.