A complainant’s unexplained delay in  prosecuting a claim under the UDRP is not generally prejudicial to its  relief, except where in the interim “the lapse of time coupled with the  existence of circumstances ... make it inequitable to enforce a claim,” Pamela Anderson v. Alberta Hot Rods,  D2010-1144 (WIPO September 8, 2010).  This is an elementary principle,  but 13 years calls for an explanation.  The existence of circumstances  must necessarily be taken into account, as it is, for example, when the  respondent proves a defense under paragraph 4(c)(i) of the Policy:  “before any notice to you of the dispute, [you have] use[d] ... or  [made] demonstrable preparations to use, the domain name or a name  corresponding to the domain name in connection with a bona fide offering  of goods or services.”
In Pamela Anderson the  majority rejected the respondent’s “circumstances” argument; the dissent  did not and this raises an interesting issue about unexplained  (lengthy) delays.  The dissenting panelist in Pamela Anderson and other  decisions has been pressing his colleagues to reconsider their view  about the application of laches to a UDRP proceeding.  But so far his is  a voice in the wilderness.  He states that “unexplained delays ...  should be taken into account.”  That view, however, is not  controversial.  He even agrees with the majority if I put back in the  language that I left out: “during which rights have been allowed to  accumulate.”  The difference is that the majority has one view of the  circumstances  and the dissent another.
The dissent points out that  there is a genuine issue as to whether “Pam Anderson” is confusingly  similar to “Pamela Anderson,” although (as he concedes) the complainant  met the “generally applied test for determining if a celebrity has  acquired a common law trademark.”  The real focus in terms of  “circumstances” (raising, as it were, a triable issue) is whether the  Respondent had rights or legitimate interests in the domain name.  The  Respondent’s paragraph 4(a)(ii) rebuttal argued  that although the  domain name was currently inactive it had “used the disputed domain name  in connection with various websites in the past.”  Exactly what proof  the Respondent offered for past use is murky and clearly inadequate, but  a website featuring “biographical information about various famous  personalities, dead or alive” is not improbably making a bona fide  offering of services.
On this issue, the majority  found that the “unsupported arguments of the Respondent do not suffice  to rebut the Complainant’s prima facie case, let alone positively  establish rights or legitimate interests under the Policy.”  Indeed, the  dissent appears to recognize this problem: “if the Respondent’s proof  is inadequate, that has been brought about by the inordinate delay of  the Complainant in bringing this claim, a delay that she has not  explained, despite the issue’s having been squarely raised in the  Response.”  However, it does not appear that the Respondent submitted  any historical snapshots of the website or make any attempt to support  its argument for a right or legitimate interest.  The absence of proof a  party would be expected to offer supports an inference that it has  none. The Respondent's history of cybersquatting does not help its  credibility; its denials therefore have less weight.
Nevertheless, the dissent’s  point is not without merit.  “Pam” is not “Pamela” and the Complainant’s  trademark is for PAMELA ANDERSON not “Pam Anderson.”  More importantly,  on the paragraph 4(a)(ii) and (iii) requirements, an explanation for  the delay is not unreasonable burden in weighing the parties’ rights.   “If it is difficult for the panel to be conclusive about the issue [of  bade faith] in the light of what has happened in the last 13 years, as  it is, that result has been brought about by the delay itself and the  delay has been occasioned by the Complainant. In those circumstances,  any doubt on the issue of the legitimacy of the disputed domain name  should be resolved against the Complainant.”  Resolved against the  Complainant because it is she who has the burden of proof that the  domain name was registered in bad faith.
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